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Abstract
Previous reviews of static labor supply estimations concentrate mainly on the evidence
from the 1980s and 1990s, Anglo-Saxon countries and early generations of labor sup-
ply modeling. This paper provides a fresh characterization of steady-state labor supply
elasticities for Western Europe and the US. We also investigate the relative contribu-
tion of di¤erent methodological choices in explaining the large variation in elasticity
size observed across studies. While some recent studies show that genuine preference
heterogeneity across countries explains only a modest share of this variation (Bargain
et al., 2013), we focus here on time changes and estimation methods as key contributors
of the di¤erences across studies. Both factors can explain larger elasticities in older
studies (i.e. an increase in female labor market attachment over time and a switch from
the Hausman estimation approach to discrete-choice models with tax-benet simula-
tions). Meta-analysis evidence suggests that smaller elasticities in the recent period
may be due to the time factor, i.e. a likely change in work preferences, both in the US
and in Europe.
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1 Introduction
Static models of labor supply are very useful to predict the e¤ect of tax-benet policy
reforms ex ante, to calibrate an optimal tax model or more generally to provide an order
of magnitude of the short-term response to nancial incentives. Responsiveness is often
summarized by a measure of what Chetty et al. (2011) refer to as "steady-state elasticities",
i.e. wage or income elasticities of labor market participation or worked hours stemming from
a static framework. In principle, these estimates should also provide some information on
international di¤erences in labor supply responses. However, the variation in magnitude of
labor supply elasticities found in the literature is huge (see Evers et al., 2008) and there is
little agreement among economists on the elasticity size that should be used in economic
policy analyses (Fuchs et al., 1998). In Bargain et al. (2013), we show that only a small
share of this variation is driven by genuine di¤erences in work preference across countries.
In fact, other factors account for the large di¤erence in elasticity size observed across studies
and notably the period of investigation, which may reect changes in work preferences over
time, and modeling choices (estimation method and model specication). To understand
the relative contribution of these two factors, a careful and comprehensive survey of the
literature on steady-state elasticities is required, which we undertake in the present paper.
Our survey substantially completes previous reviews on static labor supply models. Hand-
book studies written in the 1980s mainly focus on estimations using the continuous labor
supply model of Hausman (1981) and provide evidence essentially for individuals in cou-
ples (Hausman, 1985b, Pencavel, 1986, for married men, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986,
for married women). More recent surveys incorporate some evidence from recent methods
(see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Meghir and Phillips, 2008) or focus on life-cycle models
(Keane, 2011; Keane and Rogerson, 2012; McClelland and Mok, 2012). Yet, most of these
surveys mainly summarize the available evidence for the US and the UK. Evers et al. (2008)
suggest a meta-analysis based on estimates for di¤erent Western countries, focusing essen-
tially on those obtained with the traditional Hausman approach. In the present paper, we
complete this literature by providing a wider and more comprehensive comparison of interna-
tional evidence on steady-state labor supply elasticities. We collect old and recent estimates
for Europe and the US, covering the studies based on the Hausman method, more recent
ones based on discrete-choice structural models and, when available, estimates drawn from
natural experiments.1 We acknowledge that di¤erences across studies can be driven by dif-
1We focus on labor supply decisions (hours and participation). Hence, we ignore the other margins that
are captured in the literature on the elasticity of taxable income (see Meghir and Phillips, 2008, and Saez
et al., 2012, for surveys). Arguably, these other margins partly relate to responses not directly pertaining
to productive behavior, like tax evasion and tax optimization. In this regard, hours of work still constitute
an interesting benchmark. Another margin is work e¤ort that may a¤ect wage rates. In the short run,
however, hours and participation are the only variables of adjustment for a large majority of workers. We
also leave aside the macroeconomic literature, in which elasticities are often obtained by calibration of
general equilibrium models. These elasticities are much larger than in microeconomic studies (e.g., Prescott,
1
ferences in work preferences across countries or over time and by methodological di¤erences
(data and selection, estimation method and model specication). We compare 282 elasticity
estimates resulting from 92 studies, including 156 wage elasticities for individuals in couples,
70 wage elasticities for single individuals and lone parents and 56 income elasticities.
Our results go as follows. First, we broadly conrm the modest consensus reached in the
literature, establishing that own-wage elasticities are largest for married women, smaller for
men. Recent studies conrm these ndings, but not the negative elasticities for men as
sometimes found in older studies. Estimates for men are generally positive and small, with
some exceptions (for instance Ireland and some German studies). Some of the studies for the
US and the UK, but not all, point to substantial elasticities for single parents while estimates
for childless singles are usually missing. Second, for each demographic group, we observe a
very large variance in estimates across all available studies. This is partly due to the use of
the Hausman approach, which seems to overstate elasticities compared to what is found with
more recent approaches and notably the use of discrete choice models. The other main factor
behind di¤erent estimates relates to time periods. For the US, we corroborate the ndings
of Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007), who show, using a uniform approach for di¤erent
periods, that married womens wage-elasticities decline over time. Given that the use of the
Hausman method coincides with older studies, it is nonetheless di¢ cult to disentangle the
two factors. Restricting our meta-analysis to years of common support, we nd suggestive
evidence in favor of the hypothesis of a time decline in elasticities for both the US and
Europe. This means that the result of Heim, Blau and Kahn might be generalized to EU
countries and that in both regions, a more stable attachment of women to the labor market
is responsible for more modest labor supply responses to wage variation. There is no clear
evidence that estimation methods matter  in fact, estimates from discrete choice models
are missing for the long period and should be the subject of future research. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the various empirical approaches
to estimate static labor supply elasticities. Section 3 reports and analyzes survey results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Methods: A Critical Review
The principal object of examination in this study is the size of wage and income elasticities
stemming from static labor supply models. Responsiveness to nancial incentives in these
models has been identied in various ways. There is no generally agreed-upon standard
estimation approach and we provide here a brief critical review. A more technical and
2004). Several reasons have been suggested for this: the use of representative agents and di¢ culties around
aggregation theory when heterogeneity matters (see Blanchard, 2006), the existence of a social multiplier
whereby the utility from not working is increasing in the number of people who do not work (see Alesina
et al., 2005), and factors related to the timing and the nature of labor supply adjustments (Chetty et al.,
2011).
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comprehensive presentation of these methods and their identication strategies are provided
in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Blundell et al. (2007).
Traditional estimation techniques rely on some functional specication of a labor supply func-
tion and the underlying consumption-leisure preferences. Estimation is then made through
local linearization of the budget constraint, accounting for the fact that after-tax wages
depend on the labor supply choice (Hall, 1973) or using more comprehensive techniques
(Hausman, 1981,1985a, 1985b). The approach relies on cross-section variation in working
hours and in the two main covariates, i.e. the after-tax wage and the virtual income (i.e.
the intercept of the linearized budget constraint). As a result, the main identication issue
is the endogeneity of wages and unearned income, which can be seen as an omitted variable
problem. Indeed, wages may be endogenous because unobservables a¤ecting preferences for
work, e.g., being a hard-working person, may well be correlated with unobservables a¤ecting
productivity and hence wages. Unearned income may be endogenous for similar reasons, i.e.
individuals who work harder because of unobserved preferences for work are also likely to
have accumulated more assets; if unearned income also represents income from the spouse,
positive assortative mating could imply that hard working individuals will tend to marry
similar persons, another reason for the endogeneity issue. Hence, estimates obtained from
cross-sectional variation in wages and nonlabor income across individuals are potentially bi-
ased. Instrumental variables methods have been suggested and the validity of the Hausman
approach hinges on whether the exclusion assumptions of the economic model hold. Also,
estimates are potentially contaminated by measurement errors from the division bias (cf.
Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999). In addition, a series of practical di¢ culties limit the applica-
tion of the method. First, relying on tangency conditions, the Hausman model is mainly
restricted to the case of piecewise linear and convex budget sets, i.e., a partial representation
of the e¤ect of tax-benet policies on household budget constraints. This limitation applies
equally to generalizations of the technique to non-parametric estimations (Blomquist and
Newey, 2002). To account for non-convexities, as in Hausman (1985b) and Hausman and
Ruud (1984), labor supply must be specied parametrically together with the correspond-
ing direct utility function, which implies rather restrictive forms for preferences (see the
discussion in Van Soest and Das, 2001).2 Second, quasi-concavity of the utility function is
implicitly imposed a priori. As discussed by MaCurdy et al. (1990) and MaCurdy (1992),
the Hausman method thus requires global satisfaction of the Slutsky condition by the labor
supply function for internal consistency of the model, an unnecessary behavioral restriction
that may bias estimates (see a modern statement in Heim and Meyer, 2003, and Meghir and
2Another approach is the reconvexication of the budget set. For instance, to estimate the labor supply
of married women on 1985 French data, Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) use the Hausman technique and
eliminate minor non-convexities by replacing the budget set by its convex envelope. This approach is not
possible for later years as the implementation of a minimum income scheme in 1988 has introduced high
non-convexity in the budget constraint. Similar non-convexities arise in all countries with substantial means-
tested transfers.
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Phillips, 2008). Third, the model makes it di¢ cult to handle joint labor supply decisions
within a couple or participation decisions. Instead of non-participation following simply from
the corner solution of the model, xed costs of work can be introduced, yet this additional
source of non-convexity has to be dealt with and results seem to be very sensitive to the
model specication (see the discussion in Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990).
Instead of estimating a labor supply function, the discrete choice approach is based on
the concept of random utility maximization (see van Soest, 1995, or Hoynes, 1996, among
others). Thus, it requires the explicit parameterization of consumption-leisure preferences,
for utility to be evaluated at each discrete alternative. Tangency conditions need not be
imposed and the model is in principle very general. Labor supply decisions are reduced
to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities, e.g., inactivity, part-time and full-time.
This solves several problems encountered with the Hausman method. In particular, discrete
choice modeling includes non-participation as one of the options so that both extensive and
intensive margins are directly estimated. The complete e¤ect of the tax-benet system is
easily accounted for, even in the presence of non-convexities in budget sets. Work costs, which
also create non-convexities, are dealt with relatively easily. Estimated as model parameters
as in Callan et al. (2009) or Blundell et al. (2000), they usually improve the t of these
models as they account for the fact that very few observations exist with a small positive
number of worked hours. Very few restrictions on preferences need to be imposed in discrete
choice models, notably because xed costs of work cannot be disentangled from preference
parameters, so that it makes no sense to impose the convexity of preferences (see van Soest
et al., 2002, Heim and Meyer, 2003, Bargain, 2009). The only restriction to the model is the
imposition of increasing monotonicity in consumption, which seems a minimum requirement
for meaningful interpretation and policy analysis. Joint labor supply decision for couples
is a straightforward extension of the basic model in the discrete choice setting. Yet, many
applications still treat husbandsworking hours xed at observed levels and focus on the
labor supply of women, i.e. a male chauvinist model (e.g., Bargain, 2009; such treatment
is typical in Hausman models, e.g. Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). The implication of
such separable treatment of spouseslabor supply choices is relatively unknown.
In the discrete choice approach, identication is mainly provided by nonlinearities, non-
convexities and discontinuities in the budget constraint due to tax-benet rules (see the
discussion in Blundell et al., 2007, and Bargain et al., 2013). Precisely, individuals with the
same gross wage usually receive di¤erent net wages. Indeed, as they are characterized by
di¤erent circumstances (di¤erent marital status, age, family compositions, home-ownership
status, disability status) or levels of non-labor income, their e¤ective tax schedules are dif-
ferent, i.e., di¤erent actual marginal tax rates or benet withdrawal rates. Arguably, some
of the conditioning characteristics (age, children) are also included as preference variables
in the model so that identication is essentially parametric. In practice, some exclusion
restrictions come naturally. Indeed, tax-benet rules depend on characteristics which are
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much more detailed than usual taste-shifters (e.g. benet rules depending on detailed geo-
graphical information while preferences are assumed to depend only on urban versus rural
areas or on whether the household lives in the capital city). Additional, more convincing
sources of exogenous variation are also used in some studies. Closer to the natural experi-
ment method, these consist in time or regional variation in tax-benet rules. For instance, in
the US, variation in income tax rules or in the parameters of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) across states is used in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) or Hoynes (1996). Time variation
in tax-benet rules also provide a better identication when policy reforms occur over the
period under consideration, as discussed, e.g., in Bargain et al. (2013)
A third approach consists in using policy reforms explicitly in order to identify labor supply
responses, without attempting to estimate a structural model (e.g., Eissa and Liebman,
1996). Natural experiments based on important tax-benet reforms in the US and the
UK have been extensively used to identify behavioral parameters (see the survey of Hotz
and Scholz, 2003, for the US). For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) use a di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach to identify the impact of the EITC reforms on the labor supply of
single mothers. They nd compelling evidence that single mothers joined the labor market
in response to increased nancial incentives to work. Regarding identication, the denition
of control groups might be an issue in di¤erence-in-di¤erence approaches. For instance,
responses to EITC expansions a¤ecting single mothers were evaluated using childless women
as control group, which may not be ideal given di¤erent long-term trends in labor supply in
the two groups (see Hotz and Scholz, 2003).3 Regression discontinuity (RD) is deemed better
in this respect since the nature of individuals on both sides of the discontinuity is "as good
as random" (cf. Lemieux and Milligan, 2008). Overall, much of the evidence is concentrated
in studies from the US, Canada and the UK. There is less evidence for other countries and
notably for continental Europe maybe because large reforms, creating exogenous variation
in tax-benet rules, were less available. Partly for this reason, structural models described
above have been very much in use.4 The timing of response to policy reforms or policy
discontinuity is unclear. Nonetheless, the implicit model that analysts have in mind when
discussing the "next-morning" e¤ect of the policy impact is often a static one (cf. Lemieux
3This issue is shared with the literature on the elasticity of taxable income, whereby results are sensitive
to the type of reforms exploited for identication (Saez et al., 2012). Indeed, control groups denition follows
from their income level, so that specic preferences are identied and results cannot be extrapolated. For
instance, changes in tax rates (tax credits) identify the preferences of high (low) income groups, and may
not be generalized to the whole population.
4Things are changing in the recent period. For France, for instance, some studies have recently used tax-
benet changes to evaluate the responsiveness of the labor force, including the introduction of a small tax
credit (Stancanelli, 2008), time change in income tax schedule (Carbonnier, 2008), changes in the possibility
to cumulate welfare payment for lone mothers and earnings (González, 2008), and age condition on children
for a replacement income targeted at low-income mothers who opt for full-time childcare (Piketty, 1998).
RD estimations using age conditions on the level of social assistance program are also used in Bargain and
Doorley (2011), in a similar way as Lemieux and Milligan (2008) for Canada.
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and Milligan, 2008, or Bargain and Doorley, 2011). Reduced-form approaches, based on
policy reforms or discontinuities, are increasingly used because natural experiments probably
o¤er one of the most credible sources of identication, despite the limitations outlined above.
In this way, it is important to compare estimates from these studies with those stemming
from structural model estimations. Unfortunately, these studies do not systematically report
wage elasticities. They rather report labor supply elasticities to benet or tax rate changes.
Thus, for comparability purposes, we could include only a few of them in the present survey.
Also, the fact that actual reforms notably welfare reforms in the US and the UK typically
a¤ect couples or single women with children makes that very little evidence is available for
other demographic groups, in particular for childless single individuals.
Finally, a few studies rely on long-term changes in wages as well as on observation grouping
in order to address endogeneity and the problem of measurement error in hourly wages
discussed above (Devereux, 2003, 2004). Blundell et al. (1998) also use tax-benet policy
variation over a long period to identify labor supply responses in the UK using a grouping IV
estimator. Long-term variation may pose the problem of assuming that preferences remain
stable in the long run, an issue which is rarely discussed. We include most of these studies,
at least those for which estimates can be compared with other studies, in our survey.
3 Static Labor Supply Elasticities: A Survey
We present here existing evidence on labor supply elasticities for European couples (Table
1), European single individuals (Table 2) and all demographic groups in the US (Table 3).
The reason for this classication is that US studies are more numerous (and, hence, deserve
a particular focus) and sometimes consider several demographic groups simultaneously (e.g.
Pencavel, 2002, Devereux, 2003). We separately report unconditional wage elasticities (total
hour and participation responses) and income elasticities. Tables highlight methodological
di¤erences across studies and notably where elasticities stem from the estimation of con-
tinuous labor supply functions (the Hausman approach), from the estimation of discrete
choice models, from grouped estimations or natural experiments. We can observe an over-
representation of studies based on discrete choice models with taxation, as this method is
increasingly used around the world to analyze the e¤ect of scal and social policy reforms.
We do not pretend to be fully exhaustive but nonetheless attempt to give a sense of the
range of elasticities obtained in the vast literature for Europe and the US. Some studies do
not report elasticities and unfortunately could not be included in our tables. This is the case
with some studies using labor supply models (e.g., Hoynes, 1996, reports income elasticities
but not wage elasticities) and more generally the case with studies using policy reforms as
natural experiments, as indicated above (for instance Bingley and Walker, 1997, for the UK,
or Eissa and Liebman, 1996, for the US). In addition to Tables 1-3, the analysis below is
supported by graphics obtained using wage-elasticity estimates drawn from these tables.
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3.1 Overview
Figure 1 plots the distribution of wage-elasticity estimates by demographic group. The
vertical axis reports the frequency (number of estimates). The rst observation is that
married women is the group with the largest number of available estimates. The second lesson
from these graphs is that, in line with conventional wisdom, elasticities are largest among
married women and single mothers, with mean values of :43 and :59 respectively. These
groups also show much dispersion across available studies. While a majority of estimates
for married women are found between 0 and :50, estimates for single mothers are far less
numerous and more dispersed over a broad range of values. Married and single men (mean
value: :12) and childless single women (mean value: :23) show much less variation and most
estimates stand in a narrow range between 0 and :30. These conclusions do not change
radically if we consider more specic types of elasticities, namely total hour elasticities or
participation elasticities (detailed results available from the authors). We now discuss each
demographic group specically.
Married Women. Considering Tables 1 and 3, we observe much dispersion in estimates
for married women. This is conrmed in Figure 2 (top left quadrant) where we plot the dis-
tribution of wage-elasticity estimates for each country. The black triangular cursors indicate
mean values over all available estimates for each country. Mean elasticities for the UK and
the US hide a very broad dispersion across studies. Di¤erence in elasticity size may be driven
by heterogeneity in work preferences across countries and over time, or by methodological
reasons. As far as genuine international di¤erences are concerned, we suggest that larger
wage-elasticities prevail in countries where womens participation is low: This seems to be
the case in our survey estimates for Ireland and Italy, which is conrmed in the discussions
in Callan et al. (2009) and Aaberge et al. (2002) for these two countries respectively. In
contrast, womens participation is high in Nordic countries and elasticities tend to be fairly
small there, notably in Finland and Denmark but also Sweden and Norway. An exception is
Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) for Sweden, but the authors examine data from the
1980s, while more recent evidence by Flood et al. (2004) conrm small hour elasticities for
this country. Comparing Italy and Norway/Sweden, Aaberge et al. (1999) show that lower
participation rates among married women in Italy leads to a larger potential for reforms
that increase nancial incentives to work. Larger elasticities coincide with more intermittent
labor force participation patterns in Southern countries and Ireland, as opposed to more
consistent participation and more constant hours in Scandinavian countries. Apart from
these extreme cases, di¤erences across EU countries, and notably countries of Continental
Europe, may not be very large, as suggested by Evers et al. (2008). This is conrmed by
Bargain et al. (2013): Using an harmonized framework for 17 EU countries and the US, they
nd estimates for married women ranging in a narrow interval :2  :6. This is indeed where
mean values lie in Figure 2 (top left quadrant), with few exceptions. Yet, direct comparisons
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across studies are necessarily muddled by methodological di¤erences, notably the period of
investigation and the estimation method. We investigate the role of these two factors in the
next sub-section.
Single Mothers. This demographic group has received some attention in the literature
because of its importance for welfare analysis, given its higher risk of poverty, and because
single parent families were primarily concerned by reforms like tax credit extensions in the
US (cf. Hotz and Scholz, 2003) or the UK (Blundell et al., 2000). This group is found
to be more responsive to nancial incentives than the average, at least in the UK, the US
and Sweden. This is conrmed in Tables 2 and 3, where relatively large elasticities are
shown in several studies, but not all. There is indeed much variance across estimates for
lone mothers, in particular for the UK, as can be seen in Figure 2 (bottom right quadrant).
Moderate estimates are found in some studies for the UK (Blundell et al., 1992) and the US
(Dickert et al., 1995) while other papers point to much larger elasticities (e.g., Keane and
Mo¢ tt, 1998, for the US or many of the British studies). Importantly, this demographic
group has become much larger in the recent period in Anglo-Saxon countries, which implies
possible changes in the selection e¤ect. That is, this group may be less negatively selected
in terms of labor market participation in the recent period. For the US, Bishop et al.
(2009) study all single women over a long period (1979-2003), using a simple estimation of
hours and participation on repeated cross-sections. They report a signicant decline in hour
wage-elasticities over the period and relatively small elasticities in the recent years (at least
compared to typical estimates for married women).
Men and Childless Singles Individuals. There is a long history of estimating male
labor supply (see surveys of Hausman, 1985b, and Pencavel, 1986, for married men). Es-
timates of wage-elasticities for this group are usually very small, often not signicant and
sometimes negative. Studies reported in Table 1 broadly conrm these stylized facts for
married men. There are few exceptions, with larger elasticities in Ireland and in some of the
German studies. Evidence for childless single men and women, gathered in Table 2, is rela-
tively limited, despite the growing proportion of this demographic group in the population.
This limited evidence is essentially explained by methodological reasons. First, estimates are
usually more precise for couples or single mothers than for childless single individuals. This
can be due to the fact that there is less variation in labor market behavior among childless
singles or that non-participation corresponds more often to demand-side constraints (rather
than to voluntary choice) in their case. This argument equally applies to single men yet
the t of labor supply model for married men should be overall better when male and female
decisions are jointly estimated. Second, estimates stemming from natural experiments are
also limited for this group, given the fact that most welfare reforms in Anglo-Saxon countries
concerned individuals or households with children (see the discussion in Bargain and Doorley,
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2011). The few available estimates point to very small elasticities.5 For both men (married
or single) and childless single women, estimates are not only small but very similar between
studies for each country. This small variance across studies is illustrated in Figure 2 (top
right quadrant for men and bottom left quadrant for childless single women). Nonetheless,
these mean values may hide much variation in participation responses across di¤erent wage
or income groups, with important implications for welfare analysis as suggested by see Eissa
and Liebman (1996) and conrmed for single individuals in Bargain et al. (2013).
Income Elasticities. Most studies show negative income elasticities of labor supply, i.e.
leisure (or non-market time) is a normal good. Yet, positive income elasticities are encoun-
tered in some studies, which include Kuismanen (1997) for Finland, Flood and MaCurdy
(1992) for Sweden, van Soest (1995) for the Netherlands and Blau and Kahn (2007) and
Cogan (1981) for the US. Also, despite being generally small, income elasticities vary across
countries. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report that variation between studies regarding
income elasticity appears to be greater than the corresponding variation with respect to
wage elasticities. This is not conrmed in the series of estimates produced for 18 countries
in Bargain et al. (2013) and neither in Tables 1-3 here. Note that very few estimates of
income e¤ects are available for single individuals.
3.2 Year of Observation and Estimation Methods
In Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-2, we have observed much variation across studies in the size of
wage-elasticities, especially for married women and single mothers. This may correspond to
genuine country di¤erences in work preferences (individual preferences or social preferences
embodied in the type of public childcare available in each country). Yet, using a uniform
approach that rules out methodological di¤erences, Bargain et al. (2013) show that the
variation across countries is small. Therefore, most of the heterogeneity across studies must
be driven by various methodological choices and in particular the period of observation and
the estimation method. We focus on these two aspects hereafter, concentrating on married
women and single mothers.
Time Trends. In Figure 3 (left quadrant), we plot estimates by year of data collection as
specied in surveyed studies (Tables 1-3). A very clear declining trend emerges, showing in
particular a concentration of low elasticities since the end of the 1990s, high elasticities in the
1970s and more variation in between. This pattern can be observed for both married women
and single mothers. Given the small number of US studies reporting estimates for the latter
group, we focus on married women in the right quadrant of Figure 3 where we distinguish
5For instance, Euwals and Van Soest (1999) report wage elasticities for childless single individuals in the
Netherlands of around :10   :11. For Germany, a series of studies report estimates between :10 and :36 for
childless single men and women.
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between EU and US estimates. The trend is similar in both regions, with a strong negative
correlation between the period of observation and the elasticity level.6 These ndings tend
to corroborate the result of Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007), who show that the labor
supply elasticity of married women has strongly declined over time in the US, revealing a
change in work preferences of women. Our results also suggest that a similar trend exist
for EU countries. Yet, results in Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) rely on a uniform
approach for the di¤erent periods while our meta-analysis possibly mixes time e¤ects and
changes in modeling and estimation methods over time.
EstimationMethods. To investigate this point further, let us get back to survey Tables 1-
3. A rst observation is that early evidence using the Hausman technique points to relatively
large own-wage elasticities for married women, sometimes close to 1, or even larger, for
instance in early studies for France, Germany, Italy or the UK. In contrast, recent evidence
based on discrete-choice models shows more modest elasticities for this demographic group,
in a range between :1 and :5, with some exceptions. In Table 3, we observe a similar pattern
for the US, with very large estimates in early studies, including Hausman (1981), and more
modest and comparable elasticities in the recent studies (total hour wage-elasticities ranging
between :2 and :4). Hence, we can conjecture that the estimation method explains time
di¤erences. With the Hausman approach, the combination of restrictive functional forms
(linear labor supply) and estimation methods that impose theoretical consistency of the
labor supply model everywhere in the sample (global satisfaction of Slutsky conditions) can
lead to biased estimates and possibly an overstatement of work incentives, as discussed above.
In addition, this approach is more sensitive to the model specication which may explain
the large variance in estimates from the 1970s and 1980s. Mroz (1987) shows how the wage
e¤ects of married womens labor supply varies dramatically depending on whether and how
one controls for non-random selection into work as well as to alternative exclusion restrictions
in the instrument set for wages. Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) discuss the sensitivity of
their results to the model specication and show that the Hausman approach can lead to
implausibly high elasticity values, as they nd in some of their specications. Drawn from
our tables, we can see for instance that married womens wage elasticity obtained with the
Hausman approach vary from :28 (Triest, 1990) to :97 (Hausman, 1981) in the US, even
when similar periods are considered (1983 and 1975 in these two studies respectively). For
France, estimates for married women are also very high with the basic Hausman model, but
almost zero when introducing xed costs (cf. Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990). Estimates
obtained with discrete choice models are somewhat more comparable from one study to
the next. Yet there are still di¤erences, which are more likely driven by selection criteria
(for France, high elasticities are found for families with children in Choné et al., 2003) and
alternative specications of discrete-choice models (for instance, the degree of exibility of
6We also nd similar patterns when looking separately at hour wage-elasticities (correlation of  :59) and
participation wage-elasticities (correlation of  :54) for married women.
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the model, see Bargain, 2009).
Meta-Analysis. We attempt to clarify whether elasticities truly decline over time or
whether this pattern is due to changes in estimation methods. To do so, we plot elastici-
ties according to two broad modeling choices in Figure 4 (upper panels), namely estimates
obtained with continuous models (which rely mainly on the Hausman approach for identi-
cation) and those from discrete-choice models (as recently used in many policy papers).
Both graphs show that the former method was mainly used before 1990 while the latter took
over in the 1990s and 2000s. For continuous models, there are nonetheless some observations
in the more recent years so that we can suggest tentative interpretations. For our group of
interest, and whether single mothers are included (right) or not (left), the time shrinking
elasticity hypothesis is veried over all estimates relying on the Hausman approach. When
di¤erentiating between regions and focusing on married women (Figure 4, lower panels),
this meta-analysis corroborates the nd in Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) for the
US (both studies relying on a Hausman-type approach). A similar pattern is found for EU
estimates but it is noticeable that there are very few estimates based on the Hausman model
for the period after 1990 in EU countries, so the result is more fragile than for the US. If
we turn to estimates from discrete choice models, the pattern is not so clear and few points
of observations are available before the 1990s. There is a negative linear correlation ( :37)
between years and estimates due to the high density of very low estimates in the years 2000s.
Yet it becomes close to null if we focus on the years before 1998. Thus, if the shrinking elas-
ticity trend is driven by a change in preferences precisely between the 1970s/1980s and the
1990s/2000s, it cannot be captured by the available estimates based discrete choice model-
ing. This calls for further research comparing methods over the long run or replicating Heim
(2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) using the discrete-choice approach. We nally suggest a
meta-analysis on the years for which we can nd some common support in the use of the two
empirical methods. That is, we restrict our sample to a period starting with the data year
of the rst estimate obtained with a discrete choice model (estimates on CPS 1985 in Eissa
and Hoynes, 2004, and on the Dutch Labor Mobility Survey 1985 in van Soest et al., 1990).
We regress elasticity values for married women on a set of simple model characteristics.
Results are reported in Table 4. The main conclusion is that estimation periods ("year")
turn out to play a signicant role. An additional year decreases wage elasticities of married
women by around :013, which amounts to a decrease of :31 over a period of 24 years (the
duration considered in Heim, 2007). In contrast, the estimation method ("discrete model"
dummy) is broadly insignicant. That is, the "overestimation" due to the Hausman model
is not particularly visible when time e¤ects are taken into account. Results are basically
unchanged whether we consider total hour elasticities or participation response alone. The
same is true if we focus on EU estimates only or if we extend the period to all the years in our
11
sample of estimates for married women (last column of Table 4).7 Thus it seems that this
meta-regression conrms the graphical analysis above, both for the US and EU countries.
The limitation due to the limited common support nonetheless applies here too. Additional
results in Table 4 show that modeling options a¤ect elasticity size very marginally. An ex-
ception is the use of desired rather than observed hours, which inates hour wage-elasticities.
This necessarily reects the role of demand-side or institutional constraints on working time
and the fact that models estimated on observed work duration do underestimate potential
labor supply responses.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an extensive survey of studies estimating static labor supply elas-
ticities for Western Europe and the US. We do not only conrm most of the usual stylized
facts from older reviews but also derive original results concerning the variation in labor
supply responses across studies. While Bargain et al. (2013) show that international hetero-
geneity in work preference matters but is small, we investigate the role of two factors that
greatly inuence the variance in elasticity size across studies, namely the time period and the
estimation method. Large elasticities are mainly due to labor market conditions of the 1970s
and 1980s (notably more intermittent female labor market participation than in the recent
period) and to the use of Hausman-type of model estimation. More recent estimates based
on structural discrete-choice models with tax-benet simulations show smaller estimates and
relatively more similarity across studies. More estimates than what is currently available are
required to disentangle the relative contribution of the time e¤ect on the one hand (i.e.
larger elasticities in the 1970s/1980s driven by lower female participation) and estimation
methods on the other (i.e. overestimation due to the Hausman model). Our meta-analysis
nonetheless conrms that elasticities for married women have declined over time in the US
(as shown in Heim, 2007, and Blau and Kahn, 2007) and extends this result to the EU. This
time e¤ect reects a change in work preferences and possibly social preferences embodied
in public childcare institutions and a stronger attachment of women to the labor market.
It is consistent with similar explanations for cross-country di¤erences (Bargain et al., 2013),
i.e. the fact that countries with more rmly established female participation show smaller
elasticities.
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Figure 3: Time Trend in Wage-Elasticities of Married Women and Single Mothers
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Table 1: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Couples
Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Country Authors Data selection Model Specication Tax-benet hours particip. hours particip. female male
Austria Dearing et al.
(2007)
SILC (2004), at least 1 child
aged <10
D QU; M ITABENA [.07,.19]@
Belgium Orsini (2007, 2012) Panel Survey of Belgian
Households (2000-01), work-
ing age
D QU and GU +
PTD; J
MODETE [.16,.31] [.10, .19] [.10,.18] [.08,.15]
Dagsvik et al.
(2011)
National Register Data
(2002), working age
D polynomial MIMOSI .44 .21 .31 .18
Denmark Smith (1995) Administrative register data
(1980-86)
C SL PL .061 .093 0 -.025
Frederiksen et al.
(2008)
Survey by Statistics Denmark
(1996), age 18-59
C SL, FC PL .148 .05 -.007 -.006
Finland Kuismainen (1997) LFS (1989), survey & tax reg-
ister; 25-60
C SL, R PL [0,.06] [.11,.27]
Bargain & Orsini
(2006)
IDS (1998), working age, men
all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.10,.18] [.10,.17]*
France Bourguignon &
Magnac (1990)
LFS (1985), couples aged 18-
60
C/T LL + R; M or J PL, D 1 (.05 with
FC)
.10 -.03 (-.02
with FC)
-.07
Laroque & Salanie
(2002)
matched LFS-Tax returns
(1999), women aged 25-49
D joint particip. &
wage; unempl. &
min. wage
own calc. (.96) / -.11*
Choné et al. (2003) matched LFS-Tax returns
(1997), working age, children
aged <6
D QU, joint wage &
CC; min. wage
own calc. 1.05 [.8,.9]@ -.19 / -.18*
Bargain & Orsini
(2006)
HBS (1994/5), working age
women, men all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.52,.65] [.46,.58]*
Donni & Moreau
(2007)
HBS (2001), aged 20-60,
all employed, no children
aged<3
C QL; s-conditional
collective LS
no taxation [.24,.59] [-.35, -.06]
Germany Kaiser et al. (1992) SOEP (1983), working age C LL C, NC, D 1.04 -.04 -.18 -.28
Bonin et al. (2002) SOEP (2000), working age,
W & E
D TL + PTD; J IZAmod .27 .20 .21 .19 .15 / .09 .01 / 0
Steiner & Wrohlich
(2004)
SOEP (2002), working age,
W & E
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.16,.55]@ [.07,.21]@ [.11,.38]@ [.07,.23]@
Haan & Steiner
(2004)
SOEP (2002), working age,
W & E, one- or two-earner
couples
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.08,.56] [.04,.20] [.08,.46] [.07,.26]
Bargain & Orsini
(2006)
SOEP (1998), working age,
men all employed, W & E
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.31,.45] [.27,.38]*
Haan (2006) SOEP (2001), W & E; mar-
ried couples, 20-65 years
D TU STSM [.34, .39] [.13, .14] [.19, .22] [.12, .14]
Clauss & Schnabel
(2006)
SOEP (2004/5), couples aged
20-65
D TU; J STSM .37 .14 .24 .16
Wrohlich (2006) SOEP (2002), working age,
W & E
D TU; J; CC STSM [.14,.53]@ [.06,.16]@
Dearing et al.
(2007)
SOEP (2004), at least 1 child
aged <10, W
D QU; M STSM [.13,.24]@
Bargain et al.
(2010)
SOEP (2003), working age,
potential one- or two-earner
D/H QU + PTD, R; J STSM [.19,.34] [.08,.20] [.05, .08] [.04,.13]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age,
W & E, potential one- or two-
earner
D TU+PTD;J FiFoSiM .38 .15 .20 .14
Ireland Callan & van Soest
(1996)
IDS (1987), desired hours D/H TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.50,.85] .31 /.20* [.10,.20]
Callan et al. (2009) Living in Ireland Survey
(1995), desired hours
D TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.71,.90] .49 [.21,.31] .20 /.21*
Italy Colombino & Del
Boca (1990)
Turin Survey of Couples
(1979), working age
C LL PL 1.18 .64 .52
Aaberge et al.
(1999)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1987), aged 20-70
A non-linear hours,
exog. wage and
unearned inc.
own calc. .74 .65 .053 .046 -.014 -.003
Aaberge et al.
(2002, 04)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1993)
A GU; J own calc. .66 .51 .12 .02
Netherlands van Soest et al.
(1990)
Labor mobility survey (1985),
working age
C/D LL, R; discrete
wage-hours combi-
nations
PL [.35,.59] .12 [.15,.19] -.23 -.01
van Soest (1995) SOEP (1987) D TU + PTD, R; J own calc. [.42, .54] [.05,.09] .008 -.03
van Soest & Das
(2001)
SOEP (1995), aged 16-64, de-
sired hours
D TU + FC, R; J own calc. [.67,.74] [.07,.10]
van Soest et al.
(2002)
Dutch SOEP (1995), aged 16-
64, desired hours
D QU (+ more ex-
ible) + FC, R; si-
mult. wage estima-
tion, J
own calc. [.83, 1.36] [.35,.58]*
Bloemen (2009) SEP (1990-2001), couples
w/o children, age 22-60
D QL own [.22, .61] [.24, .61] -.057
Bloemen (2010) SEP (1990-2002), couples
w/o children, age 22-60
D QU, FC own [.14, .31] [-.02, .03]
Mastrogiacomo et
al. (2013)
Labour Market Panel (1999-
2005)
D QU, FC CPB model [.22, .52] [.17, .40] [.05, .19] [.05, .16]
Norway Dagsvik, Strom
(2006)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1994/5); married couples
D polynomial Statistic
Norway
model
.65 .28
Aaberge & Colom-
bino (2012)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1994/5); married couples
D polynomial Statistic
Norway
model
.21 .31 .23 .16
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Table 1: Labor Supply Elasticties in Europe: Couples (cont.)
Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Country Authors Data selection Model Specication Tax-benet hours particip. hours particip. female male
Spain García & Suárez
(2003)
ECHP (1994-95), aged 16-65,
obs. and desired hours
C LL taxes .37 1.51* -.06
Fernández-Val
(2003)
ECHP (1994-99), aged<65
and in work
C unitary/collective
model
no taxation .31
Crespo (2006) ECHP (1994-99), aged<65
and in work
C QL, uni-
tary/collective
no taxation .14 .01
Labeaga, Oliver &
Spadaro (2008)
ECHP (1995), working age D QU + FC; J GLAD- HIS-
PANIA
.29 .26 .01 .11
Sweden Blomquist (1983) Level of Living Survey (1974),
all employed, aged 25-55
C LL, R PL .008 -.03
Flood & MaCurdy
(1992)
Household Market-
Nonmarket Survey (1983),
all employed, 25-65
C LL and SL, R PL, D [-.25,.21] [-.01,.04]
Blomquist &
Hansson-Brusewitz
(1990)
Level of Living Survey (1981),
all employed, aged 25-55
C LL and QL, R PL, C and
NC
[.38,.77] [.08,.13] [-.24, -.03]
Blomquist &
Newey (2002)
Level of Living Survey (1973,
80, 90), all employed, aged
18-60
C non-parametric la-
bor supply
PL [.04,.12
Flood et al. (2004) Household Income Survey
(1993), aged 18-64
D TU, R; stigma of W own calc. .12 0 -.017 -.003
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual
Data, Income Distribution
Survey, 1999
D TU, R FASIT .18 .15 .06 0
Switzerland Gern & Leu
(2003)
Swiss Income and Expendi-
ture Survey (1998)
D quadratic utility,
random preferences
Tax model
for Basel-
Stadt
.56 .36 .03 .01 -.06 / -.04 -.001 / 0
UK Arellano & Meghir
(1992)
British FES and LFS (1983),
aged 20-59, with pre-school
children (upper bound for all
children)
C SL + FC, search
costs, endogenous
wage and unearned
income (IV)
PL [.29,.71] - [-.13, -.40]
Arrufat & Zabalza
(1986)
British General Household
Survey (1974), aged <60
C CES utility based
labor supply, R
PL [.62-2.03] 1.41 -.2 / -.14
Blundell & Walker
(1986)
FES (1980), all employed,
aged 18-59
C Gorman polar form
and translog hours,
R
PL .024 -.287
Blundell et al.
(1987)
FES (1981), aged 16-60 T/H non-linear labor
supply, unemploy-
ment risk
own calc. [.0,.408]
Blundell et al.
(1998)
FES (1978-92), 20-50, young
children (lower bound if no
child)
C generalized LES, R PL [.13,.37]@ - [-.19, 0]@
Blundell et al.
(2000)
Family Resources Survey
(1994-96)
D QU + FC, R, W TAXBEN [.11 - .17]
Data: Incom e D istribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), So cio Econom ic Panel (SOEP), Fam ily Exp enditure Survey (FES),
Labor Force Survey (LFS), EU Statistics on Incom e and Liv ing Conditions (SILC). For Germany: West (W ), East (E). M odel: C = continuous
lab or supply (Hausman 1981 typ e); T = tobit model; D = discrete-choice model (van Soest 1995 typ e); A = estim ation of jo int d istributions of
wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportun ities vary across ind iv iduals); H = double hurd le model (lab or supply and risk of unemploym ent).
Sp ecication : for Hausman model, lab or supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or sem i-log (SL); in d iscrete-choice models, utility is either
quadratic (QU), translog (TU) or generalized Stone-G eary (GU); random preferences are som etim es accounted for (R ) as well add itional exib ility,
e ither through xed costs (FC) or part-tim e dumm ies (PTD). Models are male-chauvin istic (M ) or account for jo int decision in couples (J). Welfare
programme partic ipation (W ). Childcare costs (CC). Tax-b enet: Hausman model often accounts for p iecew ise-linear budget set (PL) or more
generally convex set (C ); nonconvexities are som etim es accounted for (NC); d i¤erentiab ility of the budget function can b e used (D ); w ith d iscrete
choice models, complete tax-b enet system s are simulated and we ind icate the nam e of the m icrosimulation model when it is known. E lastic ities:
brackets ind icate the range of values for a ll sp ecications (or the condence interval when availab le). @ ind icates that the range also includes
values for d i¤erent age and number of ch ildren . Partic ip . = partic ipation elastic ities, corresp onding to the increase in employment rate in %
points, except when ind icated by * (in that case, % increase in employm ent rate). For Spain , several add itional references are cited in García and
Suárez (2003) which point to sim ilar elastic ities as in the basic model in th is study.
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Table 2: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Single Individuals
Wage elast. Income
Country Authors Data selection Model Specication Tax-benet hours particip. elast.
Belgium Dagsvik et al.
(2011)
National Register Data,
2002, working age, SW
D polynomial MIMOSI .13 .07
SM .2 .11
Finland Bargain &
Orsini (2006)
IDS (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.18, .34] [.18, .33]
France Bargain &
Orsini (2006)
HBS (1994/5), aged 25-49,
SW, SP
D QU + FC EUROMOD [.08, .14] [.04, .07]
Laroque &
Salanie (2002)
LFS-Tax return matched
dataset (1999), women
aged 25-49, no civil ser-
vants, SW
D participation (and
full/part-time) model,
simultaneous wage and
labor supply estimation,
probability of unemploy-
ment, min. wage
own calc. .36
Germany Bargain &
Orsini (2006)
SOEP (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.09, .18] [.08, .15]
Steiner &
Wrohlich (2004)
SOEP (2003), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.20, .36] [.05, .09]
Haan & Steiner
(2004)
SOEP (2002), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.02, .24] [.01, .10]
SM [.08, .31] [.04, .28]
Clauss & Schn-
abel (2006)
SOEP (2004/5), aged 20-
65, SW
D TU + PTD STSM .38 .18
SM .23 .17
Haan & Uhlen-
dor¤ (2007)
SOEP (2000-5), age 25-59,
SM
D reduced form risk model;
non-parametric random
coe¢ cient
STSM [.016, .036] [.05, .12]
Fuest et al.
(2008)
SOEP (2004), working
age, SW
D TU + PTD FiFoSiM .28 .13
SM .28 .17
Bargain et al.
(2010)
SOEP (2003), working
age, SW
D/H QU + PTD; involuntary
unemployment
STSM [.06, .16] [.04, .10]
SM [.10, .20] [.05, .12]
Italy Aaberge et al.
(2002)
Survey on Household In-
come and Wealth (1993),
SW
A GU own calc. .10 .06
SM .11 .08
Netherlands Euwals & Van
Soest (1999)
Dutch SOEP (1988), ac-
tual and desired hours,
SW
D TU + FC, R own calc. [.03, .45]
SM [.03, .18]
Mastrogiacomo
et al. (2013)
Labour Market Panel,
1999-2005, SW
D QU, FC CPB Model [.04, .62] [.01, .43]
SM [.14, .45] [.09, .32]
Norway Aaberge &
Colombino
(2012)
Survey of Income and
Wealth (1994/5); SW
D polynomial Statistic
Norway
model
-.09 .12
SM -.02 .04
Sweden Andren (2003) HINK (1997-98), SP D QU + FC; simulat. with
W and CC
own calc. [ .55, .87] .50 -.1
Brink et al.
(2007)
Longitudinal Individual
Data, IDS, 1999, SP
D TU, R FASIT .51 .35
UK Walker (1990) FES (1979-84), SP D participation model benets only .70
Ermisch &
Wright (1991)
General household survey
(1973-82), SP
D participation model,
demand-side controls
simplied
system
1.7
Jenkins (1992) Lone parents survey
(1989), SP
D+H two positive hour choices,
unemployment risk, FC
benets only 1.8
Blundell et al.
(1992)
FES (1981-1986), SP C marginal rate of substitu-
tion function, endogenous
wage and income
taxation
only
.34
Brewer et al.
(2006)
FES (1995-2002), aged
<60, SP
D QU + FC, joint with W
and CC, R
TAXBEN 1.02
Data & Selection : Incom e D istribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), So cio Econom ic Panel (SOEP), Fam ily Exp enditure
Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS); Selection : single women (SW ), single m en (SM ), single parents/mothers (SP). M odel: C = continuous
LS (Hausman 1981 typ e); T = tobit model; D = discrete model (van Soest, 1995 typ e); A = estim ation of jo int d istributions of wage and hours (sets
of hour-wage opportun ities vary across ind iv iduals); H = double hurd le model (lab or supply and risk of unemployment). Sp ecication : for Hausman
model, lab or supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or sem i-log (SL); in d iscrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU)
or generalized Stone-G eary (GU); random preferences (R ); xed costs (FC); welfare partic ipation (W ); ch ildcare costs (CC). Tax-b enet: Hausman
model often accounts for p iecew ise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C ); nonconvexities are som etim es accounted for (NC);
d i¤erentiab ility of the budget function can b e used (D ); w ith d iscrete choice models, complete tax-b enet system s are simulated and we ind icate
the nam e of the m icrosimulation model when it is known. E lastic ities: brackets ind icate the range obtained in function of the sp ecication at use,
or the condence interval when availab le. Partic ip . = partic ipation elastic ities, corresp onding to the increase in employm ent rate in p ercentage
p oints.
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Table 3: Labor Supply Elasticities for the US
Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Authors Data selection Model Specication hours particip. hours particip. female male
Cogan (1981) US NLSW 1967,
married women
aged 30-35
C SL; reservation hours to
account for FC; no tax-
benet
[.86 , 2.40] [.16 , .66]
Hausman (1981) PSID 1975, married
women
C LL, PL (C and NC: FC) [.90 , 1.00] [-.13 , -.12]
Triest (1990) PSID 1983, married
women, aged 25-55
C LL; C and PL; taxes and
benets
[.03 , .28] [-.15 , -.19]
MaCurdy et al.
(1990)
PSID 1975: mar-
ried men, aged 25-
55
C LL; PL and D (reconvexi-
ed) budget set; taxes
[-.24, .03] -.01
Dickert et al.
(1995)
SIPP 1990, single
mothers, no assets
D joint program and labor
force participation
.35
Pencavel (1998) CPS 1975-94, mar-
ried women, aged
25-60
C Log-L; no tax-benet [.77,.1.80]
, single women,
aged 25-60
[.77,.1.80]
Hoynes (1996) SIPP panel, 1984,
married men and
women with chil-
dren
D Stone-Geary; stigma from
AFDC; tax-benet sys-
tem; FC
- .46 - .12
Keane and Mo¢ tt
(1998)
1994 SIPP, single
mothers, no assets
D joint labor supply and
welfare program partici-
pation; benets but no tax
.96
Pencavel (2002) CPS 1999, married
men
C LL; no tax-benet [.12,.25]
CPS 1999, single
men
[.12,.25]
Devereux (2003) Census and PSID,
married men
C Log-L, no tax-benet [-.022, .017] [-.061, .001]
single men [-.022, .017] [-.061, .001]
Devereux (2004) PUMS 1980,1990,
married couples
(participating men)
C Log-L, no tax-benet [.17,.38] [.00,.07]
Eissa & Hoynes
(2004)
CPS 1985 to 1997,
less educated mar-
ried couples with
children
D Participation Probit, joint
estimation
.27 .03 -.039 -.007
Blau & Kahn
(2007)
CPS 1980, married
men and women
age 25-54
C Log-L [.77,.88] [.01,.07] .004 .001
CPS 1990 C Log-L [.58,.64] [.10,.14] .002 .002
CPS 2000 C Log-L [.36,.41] [.04,.10] .001 .002
Heim (2007) CPS, 1979-2003,
married women
SL, participation, some
account for tax
.36 (1979) to
.14 (2003)
.66 (1979) to
.03 (2003)
-.05 (1979) to -
.015 (2003)
Heim (2009) PSID 2001, couples quadratic utility with con-
tinuous labor supply, J,
FC, R
[.24,.33] [.07,.18] [.04,.07] [.00,.003] [-.007, -.006] -.0007
Bishop et al. (2009) CPS, 1979-2003,
sing. women
SL, participation, some
account for tax
.14 (1979) to
-.03 (2003)
.28 (1979) to
.22 (2003)
-.014 (1979) to -
.019 (2003)
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS), National Longitud inal Surveys of Young Women and Mature Women (NLSW ), Panel Study on Incom e
Dynam ics (PSID ), Public U se M icrodata Sample (PUMS), Survey of Incom e and Program Partic ipation (SIPP). M odel: C= continuous lab or
supply (Hausman 1981 typ e); D= discrete-choice model (often a simple partic ipation prob it). Sp ecication : Hausman lab or supply is either linear
(LL), log-linear (Log-L) or sem i-log (SL); random preferences are som etim es accounted for (R ) as well as xed costs (FC). M odels som etim es
account for p iecew ise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C ) or nonconvexities (NC), and di¤erentiab le budget constra int (D ).
E lastic ities: brackets ind icate ranges of values over d i¤erent sp ecications, or rep orted condence intervals. Partic ipation elastic ities ("partic ip"):
increase in employ. rate in % points.
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Table 4: Meta Regression of Married Womens Wage-Elasticities
Model
year -0.013 *** -0.012 * -0.012 * -0.013 ** -0.024 ***
(.005) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.004)
discrete model 0.013 0.170 -0.007 0.043 -0.012
(.079) (.251) (.098) (.090) (.089)
desired hours 0.185 ** 0.086 0.237 ** 0.177 ** 0.121
(.079) (.114) (.106) (.083) (.095)
joint decision -0.026 -0.087 0.024 -0.013 0.008
(.062) (.085) (.088) (.067) (.071)
fixed cost # 0.025 -0.024 0.069 0.014 0.041
(.057) (.074) (.082) (.060) (.070)
US -0.045 -0.083 0.006 -0.046
(.084) (.150) (.108) (.083)
constant 0.462 *** 0.323 0.454 *** 0.439 *** 1.025 ***
(.079) (.283) (.089) (.085) (.096)
Nb of observations 75 32 43 67 90
R2 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.40
All years
Note: we regress elasticity values on modeling choices using estimates on data from 1985-2004, except the last column
(1967-2004). #: work cost specification in discrete models
All elasticities Participationelasticities Hour elasticities Without the US
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